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SMALL V. UNITED STATES: DEFINING "ANY" AS A
SUBSET OF "ANY"
I. INTRODUCTION
"It shall be unlawful for any person.., who has been convicted
in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term ex-
ceeding one year ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition .... I, Although this statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
was enacted to keep firearms out of the hands of persons not enti-
tled to possess them because of their criminal backgrounds,2 the
scope of this statute has been controversial. Specifically, the fed-
eral circuits have disagreed as to whether the phrase "any court"
applies to foreign courts as well as to domestic ones.3 Recently, in
Small v. United States,4 the Supreme Court settled the dispute
and held that the phrase "'any court' refers only to domestic
courts."5
The dissenting opinion, however, presents a more convincing
argument than the majority opinion-that the text of the statute
is unambiguous and the phrase "any court" should encompass
convictions in foreign courts as well as domestic ones.6 Moreover,
the rationale followed by the majority ignores the plain meaning
of the statute as written by Congress and supplants it with a
1. 18 U.S.C. § 922*g)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
2. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 28 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113.
3. Compare United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
phrase "convicted in any court" includes convictions in foreign courts), and United States
v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754, 759 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the phrase "convicted in any
court" includes convictions in foreign courts), with United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89,
95-96 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the phrase "convicted in any court" does not include
convictions in foreign courts), and United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir.
2000) (holding that the phrase "convicted in any court" does not include convictions in for-
eign courts).
4. See Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005).
5. Id. at 1758.
6. See id. at 1760-61 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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novel canon of interpretation that frustrates the purpose of the
statute and creates a dangerous precedent for future cases of
statutory interpretation.7 To restore the strength and purpose of
American gun control legislation in the wake of Small, Congress
should amend § 922(g)(1) to incorporate the language proposed in
Senate Bill 954.'
Part II of this note presents the background of § 922(g)(1), in-
cluding a brief legislative history and an examination of the split
in federal circuit court decisions over the meaning of "any court."
Part III discusses the factual and procedural background of
Small. Part IV analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions in
Small and argues that the dissent is more congruous with estab-
lished principles of statutory interpretation. Finally, Part V ex-
amines the potentially dangerous impacts of the majority opinion
on public safety and separation of powers and argues that Senate
Bill 954 should be enacted to preserve the purpose of § 922(g)(1).
II. THE HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
A. The History of the Statute
The current language in § 922(g)(1) has undergone a lengthy
and confusing history. The original statute, the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,' contained two provisions
relevant to the statutory language: Title IV, containing the prede-
cessor to § 922(g)(1), and Title VII, containing § 1202(a)(1). 10
7. See id. at 1765-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. See Firearms Fairness and Security Act, S. 954, 109th Cong. (2005).
9. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 922(c), 82 Stat. 197, 230 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
10. Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was intended
to "aid in making it possible to keep firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled
to possess them because of age, criminal background, or incompetency." S. REP. No. 90-
1097, at 28 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113. That Title contained the
original provision that "made it unlawful for a felon, fugitive, or one under indictment to
receive a firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce." H.R. REP. No. 90-1577, at 15 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4410, 4421. Prior to adopting the final language of the statute, Congress considered lan-
guage contained in a Senate Judiciary Committee Report that "[t]he definition of the term
'felony,' as added by the committee is a new provision. It means a Federal crime punish-
able by a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 year and in the case of State law, an offense
determined by the laws of the State to be a felony." Gayle, 342 F.3d at, 94 (quoting S. REP.
No. 90-1501, at 31 (1968)). When both houses agreed upon the final language of the stat-
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Later that year, the Gun Control Act of 196811 amended §
922(g)(1) to include the language "any court" and prohibit addi-
tional classes of persons from receiving a firearm or ammunition
shipped in interstate or foreign commerce. 12 Subsequently, the
Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986"s repealed Title VII, con-
taining § 1202(a)(1), and modified § 92 2 (g)(1) to prohibit posses-
sion as well as transport of firearms. 4 Unfortunately, despite a
lengthy record detailing these various amendments, the record
gives no express indication as to Congress's intent to include or
exclude foreign convictions in the current version of § 922(g)(1). 15
B. The Circuit Split
The controversy surrounding the meaning of the phrase "any
court" can be more thoroughly examined through an investigation
of the federal courts' varying interpretations of the phrase. 6
United States v. Winson was the first decision to address this
question and held that § 922(g)(1) includes convictions in foreign
courts.'7 Finding legislative history unhelpful," the Sixth Circuit
ute, however, they adopted the version of the House of Representatives which contained
the non-limiting language "'crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1
year.'" Id. at 95 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 90-1956, at 4, 8, 28-29 (1968), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4428). Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 contained conflicting language of § 1202(a)(1), that prior convictions must be
from "a court of the United States or of a State." 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1970 &
Supp. III 1985) (repealed 1986). Title VII, however, was not intended to conflict with the
non-limiting Title IV language. Senator Long, sponsor of Title VII, stated that § 1202
would "take nothing from" but merely "add to" Title IV. 114 CONG. REC. 14,774 (1968).
11. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213.
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1577, at 3 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4421
(adding anyone who is an "unlawful user of or addicted to marijuana, any depressant or
stimulant drug... or a narcotic drug... or has been adjudicated in any court as a mental
defective or has been committed under a court order to any mental institution"). The Gun
Control Act of 1968 did not prohibit possession per se, but referred only to the transport
and receipt of a firearm. See Recent Cases, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1267, 1269 n.25 (2004).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 99-495, at 22-23 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327,
1348-49; Recent Cases, supra note 12, at 1269 n.25.
15. See Tracey A. Basler, Note, Does "Any" Mean "All" or Does "Any" Mean "Some"? An
Analysis of the "Any Court"Ambiguity of the Armed Career Criminal Act and Whether For-
eign Convictions Count as Predicate Convictions, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 147, 177 (2002).
16. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
17. See Winson, 793 F.2d at 759. Winson was convicted by an Argentinean court in
1970 of possessing counterfeit United States currency and by a Swiss court in 1976 of
fraud. See id. at 756. Back in the United States, he was found in possession of a .460 cali-
ber Weatherby MKV rifle, a .20 gauge Browning shotgun, and a .243 caliber Colt rifle. See
2006]
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compared the text of § 922(g)(1) with that in § 1202(a),' 9 which in-
cluded specific language regarding the courts to which the statute
applies. 2' By concluding that Congress intentionally used limiting
language in the text of § 1202(a) but not in § 922(g)(1), the court
found the "any court" language in § 922(g)(1) unambiguous. 2'
Winson next examined the potential inequity flowing from the
inclusion of foreign convictions as predicate offenses in §
922(g)(1). 22 The court found, however, that there is "no reason
why the commission of serious crimes elsewhere in the world is
likely to make the person so convicted less dangerous than he
whose crimes were committed within the United States."28 More-
over, Congress avoided such injustice by allowing the Secretary of
the Treasury to grant relief when an applicant's record displays
id. at 755-56. In Winson, the court refers to 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) throughout the decision.
This section, however, is an appropriate substitute for analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See
Basler, supra note 15, at 152 n.39.
18. See Winson, 793 F.2d at 757.
19. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 1202(a), 82 Stat. 197, 236 (repealed 1986). This section includes sentencing guidelines
for "any person who has ... been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or
[a]ny political subdivision thereof of a felony." Id. Winson was argued and decided be-
fore § 1202(a) was repealed. See Basler, supra note 15, at 152.
20. See Winson, 793 F.2d at 756. Although several Supreme Court decisions have
compared § 922 and § 1202, none suggested that the two sections were intended to mean
the same thing. See id. at 757. The sponsor of the amendment, Senator Long, stated that
§ 1202 "would 'take nothing from' but merely 'add to' Title IV." Id. (quoting 114 CONG.
REc. 14,774 (1968)). Further, it is unquestionably within the power of Congress to choose
whether a statute should sweep "broadly or narrowly." Id. (quoting United States v. Rod-
gers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984)).
21. See Winson, 793 F.2d at 757. The court recognized the principle that "ambiguity
concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.'" Id. at 756
(quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)). There is no ambiguity in
§ 922(g)(1), see id. at 757, and the statute does not warrant the application of this princi-
ple.
22. See Winson, 793 F.2d at 757-58. Winson contended that the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms interpreted § 922 as being inapplicable to foreign convictions. See
id. at 758. This interpretation exists in an internal memorandum addressed to the Chief of
the Regulations and Procedures Division of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
dated May 7, 1974, in response to an inquiry dated January 11, 1974, asking whether for-
eign convictions preclude issuance of firearms permits. See id. at 758 n.4. This memoran-
dum "does not have the effect of an administrative regulation or a published rule," and is
not binding on the court. See id. Further, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
changed its position in another internal memorandum dated July 30, 1984, which stated
that "the ATF should reverse its current position so as to acknowledge the Federal fire-
arms and explosives disabilities of persons who have been convicted in foreign courts." Id.
at 758. This policy change is explained in a memorandum from Steven Higgens, Director
of Enforcement and Operations to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement
and Operations. See id. at 758 n.5.
23. Winson, 793 F.2d at 758.
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that he or she will not act in a manner dangerous to public safety
and when such a grant would not be contrary to the public inter-
est.24 The court finally noted that a categorical exemption, such as
a wholesale exclusion of foreign convictions from the reaches of §
922(g)(1), is generally not favored by the American court sys-
tem.25
The Fourth Circuit followed the Winson rationale in United
States v. Atkins. 26 The court reaffirmed the conclusion that the
"scant legislative history," the similar provision in § 1202(a), and
cases construing § 922(g)(1) and § 1202(a) do not "inject any un-
certainty into the subject language."27 Further, the court exam-
ined separately the terms "any" and "court," first finding the term
"any" to be unambiguous, "being all-inclusive in nature."2" The
court then turned to the word "court," finding that because Eng-
lish courts are similar to and based on the same legal system as
American courts, a prior conviction in England was valid as a
predicate conviction.29
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000); Winson, 793 F.2d at 758. This section has since been
suspended due to lack of fumding. See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732 (1992). Courts have
subsequently considered whether the holding in Winson relied upon the statutory avail-
ability of relief and is now invalid. See United States v. Chant, Nos. CR 94-1149 (SBA), CR
94-0185, 1997 WL 231105, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 1997) (holding that the primary focus of
Winson was that the statutory language was unambiguous, not that statutory relief was
available).
25. See Winson, 793 F.2d at 759 ("'[Clategorical exemptions from the clear commands
of a regulatory statute, though sometimes permitted, are not favored.'" (quoting Ala.
Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1979))).
26. See United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1989). Atkins was convicted by
an English court in 1981 of "unlawful possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life."
See id. at 95. In April 1987, Atkins fraudulently entered an Officers Club at Fort Myer,
Virginia. See id. Suspicious, the Fort Myer Military Police searched him and found a .38
caliber Smith & Wesson pistol fastened to his ankle. See id.
27. Id. at 96. The court also followed the rationale from Winson that if the statutory
language is unambiguous, then there is no application for the principle of lenity. See id.
(citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 n.10 (1981)).
28. Id.
29. See id. The court used the fact that English law, which provided the "origin and
antecedent" of the jurisdictional system used by the United States, is similar enough in its
system of common law and statutes refining it, that an English conviction is a fair predi-
cate for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See id. But cf Basler, supra note 15, at 156
n.62 (proposing that there may be more differences between English and American law
than Atkins suggests). Further, Atkins did not contend that his English conviction was a
violation of his civil rights or of American constitutional law, or that the English offense
would not constitute an offense of similar gravity under American law. Atkins, 872 F.2d at
96 n-1. By making the comparison between English and American law, Atkins seems to
leave an opening for conviction in a foreign court with a markedly different legal system to
2006]
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Ten years later, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Concha30
declined to follow the rationale of Winson and Atkins and held
that the phrase "convicted in any court" does not include convic-
tions in foreign courts." The court first noted that if § 922(g)(1)
were to include foreign convictions, an anomalous situation would
result because fewer domestic crimes would be covered by the
statute than foreign crimes.32 This peculiar result suggests that
Congress must have intended for § 922(g)(1) to only apply to fed-
eral and state crimes.3 The court compared this textual anomaly
with the opposing argument that "any" is unambiguous and all-
inclusive, and concluded that they are comparable in strength.
34
Concha then expressed concern that foreign criminal defen-
dants are not given the same constitutional protections that are
offered in the United States.35 Of particular worry to the court
was that persons convicted of felonies abroad had only a limited
ability to challenge a sentence based upon that foreign convic-
be improper as a predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1). But see Lewis v. United States,
445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (holding that "§ 1202(a)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a fire-
arm despite the fact that the predicate felony may be subject to collateral attack on consti-
tutional grounds").
30. 233 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000).
31. See id. at 1256; see also Bean v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838 (E.D. Tex.
2000) (holding that a foreign conviction cannot serve as a predicate offense for the purpose
of restricting firearms possession). Concha had been convicted in the United Kingdom of
three offenses. See Concha, 233 F.3d at 1250. One night, he was brought to a police station
in Taos, New Mexico, in connection with a domestic dispute. See id. at 1251. Con-
cha became verbally abusive and a scuffle ensued, during which he took possession of a
police officer's loaded gun. See id. Concha was charged with being a felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See id. The government additionally sought
to enhance his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which increases the penalty if the de-
fendant has three previous convictions. See id. Section 924 refers to "three previous con-
victions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1)" of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)
(2000). Thus, an analysis of the "any court" language in § 924(e) is analogous to that in
§ 922(g)(1).
32. See Concha, 233 F.3d at 1254. Section 921(a)(20) provides that
[t]he term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"
does not include.., any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust vio-
lations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses
relating to the regulation of business practices, or . . . any State offense clas-
sified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of
imprisonment of two years or less.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2000). Thus, certain federal and state crimes are excluded from the
definition of "crime," while the same offenses in foreign courts are not excluded. See Con-
cha, 233 F.3d at 1254.
33. See Concha, 233 F.3d at 1254.
34. See id. at 1256; see also Atkins, 872 F.2d at 96 (holding that the word "any" is un-
ambiguous).
35. See Concha, 233 F.3d at 1254.
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tion.36 The court then compared this policy argument with the op-
posing argument that foreign criminals are likely to be as dan-
gerous as domestic criminals, and concluded that these argu-
ments, too, are equal in strength.37
The court agreed with Winson that the legislative history is of
no assistance in interpreting the phrase "any court."3 The lack of
clear legislative intent, combined with equally strong textual and
policy arguments, was enough for the court to find the statute
ambiguous.39 As such, the court was guided by the rule of lenity,
and refrained from "'interpret[ing] a federal criminal statute so as
to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such
an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to
what Congress intended."'4 °
The Second Circuit followed the Concha rationale in United
States v. Gayle.4 Agreeing with the Concha court that the pecu-
liar result of including foreign convictions renders the statutory
36. See id. The court here distinguishes the present case from Winson and Atkins be-
cause a subsequent decision had restricted the ability of a felon to attack a foreign convic-
tion. See id. at 1255-56. In Custis v. United States, the Supreme Court held that collateral
attacks on the predicate convictions were not allowed, except for jurisdictional attacks
based on the total deprivation of right to counsel. See 511 U.S. 485, 490, 494-96 (1994). A
person may still bring a habeas petition to challenge the predicate conviction. See id. at
512 (Souter, J., dissenting). A defendant may bring a habeas petition even after the previ-
ous sentence had been fully served because the current sentence has been enhanced by a
"prior, unconstitutional conviction.'" Concha, 233 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Gamble v. Par-
sons, 898 F.2d 117, 118 (10th Cir. 1990)).
37. See Concha, 233 F.3d at 1256.
38. See id. The Concha court did look to the United States Sentencing Guidelines for
sentence enhancements, which are limited to offenses under federal or state law. See id. at
1254 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (2005)). In addition, the gen-
eral approach of the Guidelines is to exclude foreign convictions from a defendant's crimi-
nal history. See id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(h) (2005)).
39. See Concha, 233 F.3d at 1256.
40. Id. (quoting United States v. Diaz, 989 F.2d 391, 393 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted)); see also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Bell v. United States,
349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955). The rule of lenity, which is the well-established maxim that "ambi-
guity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity," only
applies to criminal statutes. Rewis, 401 U.S. at 812. This maxim is applied when a court is
uncertain about a statute's meaning, but is not meant to be a tool to circumvent legislative
intent. See id.; see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49 n.13 (1979) (citing United
States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978)).
41. 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003). In 1996, the defendant in Gayle was convicted in Can-
ada for using "a firearm in the commission of an indictable offense." Id. at 90. In 2001,
United States authorities suspected that the defendant had illegally entered the United
States from Canada. See id. Upon arresting him and searching his hotel room in Platts-
burgh, New York, authorities discovered a large quantity of firearms stored in boxes in his
hotel room. See id.
20061
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text ambiguous,42 the court consulted the legislative history of the
statute.4 3 Although prior decisions had found the legislative his-
tory unhelpful,4 Gayle found a Senate Committee Report and a
Conference Report particularly enlightening and in support of ex-
cluding foreign convictions from § 922(g)(1).45 Specifically, the
court found that because the Conference Report did not expressly
disagree with a Senate Report's limitation of predicate felonies
to domestic convictions indicated that Congress intended to
limit the applicability of § 922(g)(1) to domestic convictions.46
The court then noted that, "had Congress contemplated extending
the prohibition to persons having foreign convictions, it would in
all likelihood have been troubled by the question whether the
prohibition should apply to those convicted by procedures and
methods that did not conform to minimum standards of justice."47
With the federal circuits in disagreement as to whether foreign
convictions are included within the scope of § 922(g)(1), the dis-
pute was ripe for the Supreme Court to settle when it granted
certiorari to Small v. United States.
4
III. BACKGROUND OF THE SMALL CASE
In 1992, Gary Small shipped a nineteen-gallon electric water
heater from the United States to Osaka, Japan, as a present to
'his Papa-san in Okinawa."49 Believing this to be an odd present,
42. See id. at 90; supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
43. See Gayle, 342 F.3d at 90.
44. See Concha, 233 F.3d at 1256 ("The legislative history does not illuminate the
meaning of 'convictions by any court'"). United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir.
1989) ("[T]he scant legislative history ... offer[s] no illumination as to Congress' intended
meaning nor serve[s] to inject any uncertainty into the subject language."); United States
v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[A]n examination of the legislative history of
Title IV reveals no discussion of the actual meaning of the phrase 'in any court.'").
45. See Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95; supra note 10.
46. See Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95. The use of legislative history in Gayle has been criti-
cized for its "incomplete, decontextualized, and atemporal approach." Recent Cases, supra
note 12, at 1267-68. Among other criticisms, it has been suggested that the legislative his-
tory used by the court was not the legislative history of the current statute because the
court failed to recognize the legislative history of subsequent amendments such as the
Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986. See id. at 1273.
47. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95.
48. 541 U.S. 958 (2004).
49. Brief for the United States at 2, Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005)
(No. 03-750) (citations omitted).
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Japanese customs officials x-rayed the water heater and found
firearms packaged inside."0 When Small accepted delivery and
confirmed the package was his, 1 the customs officials served him
with a search warrant,52 opened the water heater, and found 2 ri-
fles, 8 pistols, and 410 ammunition shells.53 Small was charged
with violating Japan's Guns and Knives Control Law, the Explo-
sives Control Law, and the Customs Law.54 He was convicted by
the Naha District Court on all counts55 and was sentenced to im-
prisonment for a term of five years.56
Following his release from prison and return to the United
States, Small bought a gun from a firearms dealer in Pennsyl-
vania. Small pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a gun, but
reserved the right to challenge the conviction on the ground that
the predicate conviction was in a foreign court and was thus out-
side the scope of § 922(g)(1). 58 The United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania rejected Small's argu-
ment and found him in violation of § 922(g)(1).5 9 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.6" The Su-
preme Court then granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.61
50. See id.
51. See id. at 2-3.
52. See id. at 3.
53. Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1759 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brief
for the United States at 3, Small, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (No. 03-750).
54. See Brief for the United States at 3, Small, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (No. 03-750).
55. See id.
56. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1754.
57. See id. The gun that Small purchased was an SWD Cobray nine-millimeter hand-
gun, which he purchased within a week of completing his eighteen month parole following
his prison sentence for the Japanese convictions. See Brief for the United States at 3,
Small, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005) (No. 03-750). In a subsequent search of Small's apartment,
authorities, acting pursuant to a warrant, discovered a Browning .380 caliber pistol and in
excess of 300 rounds of ammunition. See id. at 4.
58. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1754.
59. See United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
60. See United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2003).
61. See Small v. United States, 541 U.S. 958 (2004).
20061
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court,
writing for a five-justice majority." The majority first concluded
that it was necessary to look past the word "any" to determine the
meaning of § 922(g)(1).13 In doing so, the majority relied upon an
initial assumption against extraterritoriality and presupposed
that Congress intended the phrase "any court" to apply domesti-
cally. 4 The majority recognized that the presumption against ex-
traterritorial application did not apply directly65 but was useful in
considering the scope of the present statute.66 The majority justi-
fied this assumption by pointing out the significant differences
between foreign and domestic convictions.6 7 First, foreign courts
might define convictions punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year differently than American courts; these for-
eign courts might convict persons for actions that American
courts would permit because of different understandings of fair-
ness or might convict persons for conduct that American courts
punish far less severely.68 Second, including foreign convictions
within the scope of § 922(g)(1) would require judges to make a dif-
ficult determination of which foreign convictions are appropriate
for recognition by the American legal system and would thus
62. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1753. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsberg
joined the majority. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the decision. Id.
63. See id. at 1754-55.
64. See id. at 1755; see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
("It is a longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a con-
trary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States."') (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
65. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1755. The majority notes that the presumption against
extraterritorial application would most directly apply to a consideration of unlawful gun
possession abroad versus domestically. See id. Section 922(g)(1) is a domestic criminal
statute that punishes gun possession in this country. See id. at 1761 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing).
66. See id. at 1755.
67. See id. at 1755-56.
68. See id. at 1755-56. The majority cites several foreign statutes that punish actions
that would not necessarily be illegal in the United States. See id.; see also Criminal Code
of the former Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic art. 153, in SOVIET CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 171-72 (H. Berman & J. Spindler trans., 2d ed. 1972) (criminalizing
"private entrepreneurial activity" and "speculation").
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leave persons convicted in foreign courts uncertain of their legal
status in the United States.69
Relying upon the assumption that the phrase "convicted in any
court" applies domestically, the majority then looked for evidence
to the contrary in the statutory language, context, history, and
purpose of § 922(g)(1).7" In direct contrast to federal circuits that
found the language unambiguous and all-inclusive,71 the majority
found that, "[t]he statute's language does not suggest any intent
to reach beyond domestic convictions."72 Further, the majority re-
affirmed the Concha approach by interpreting the statutory con-
text that anomalous results would follow from including foreign
convictions within the scope of § 922(g)(1).73
The majority also reaffirmed the Gayle approach of interpret-
ing the legislative history of the statute.74 The Court noted that
Congress's failure to explicitly address whether "any court" in-
cludes foreign courts renders the legislative history of the statute
a neutral factor, confirming that Congress did not consider the is-
sue.75 The majority conceded that the statute's purpose supported
the inclusion of foreign convictions because Congress sought to
"'keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that
they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a
threat to society.' 76 Further, the majority conceded that a person
convicted of a foreign crime might be just as dangerous as one
convicted of a domestic crime. 77 Notwithstanding those conces-
sions, the majority dismissed these concerns by stating that per-
sons with prior foreign convictions have been tried very rarely
under § 922(g)(1). 78 Because the majority could not find conclusive
69. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1756.
70. See id.
71. See United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing United
States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1989)).
72. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1756.
73. See id.; see also United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2003); Concha,
233 F.3d at 1253-54; supra text accompanying notes 32-33, 42.
74. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1757; see also Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95; supra text accompa-
nying notes 45-47.
75. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1757.
76. See id. at 1758 (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103,
112 (1983)).
77. See id.
78. See id. "[Slince 1968, there have probably been no more than '10 to a dozen'
instances in which such a foreign conviction has served as a predicate [conviction under §
922(g)(1)]." Id. This statistic suggests that, because persons with prior foreign convictions
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evidence that the language, context, history, or purpose of the
statute suggested a congressional intent to include foreign convic-
tions under the scope of § 922(g)(1), the majority concluded that
its initial assumption disfavoring extraterritorial application was
valid.79
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the dissent,"° began his
opinion by stating that by restricting the term "any" to mean "a
subset of any," the majority distorted the plain meaning of the
statute and departed from established principles of statutory con-
struction."1 Read naturally, the plain terms of § 922(g)(1) have an
expansive meaning.8 2 No modifiers or exceptions are present in
the statutory language to restrict their application. 3 In addition,
the dissent compared § 922(g)(1) with the more restrictive lan-
guage in § 921(a)(20), which expressly mentions "Federal or State
offenses." 4 Specifically, "Congress' explicit use of 'Federal' and
'State' in other provisions shows that it specifies such restrictions
when it wants to do so. " 5 Although concluding that the plain text
of § 922(g)(1) is "inescapably broad," the dissent continued to find
each argument in the majority's rationale unpersuasive.86
The dissent first argued that the majority invented a canon of
statutory interpretation by assuming that, absent a clear indica-
tion from Congress, "a statute refers to nothing outside the
are rarely tried for illegal possession of firearms, such persons are perhaps not dangerous
or do not pose a great collective threat to American society.
79. See id.
80. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined. See id.
81. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 1759 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520
U.S. 1, 5 (1997).
83. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60
(1980)).
84. See id. at 1760 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2000)).
But see Gayle, 342 F.3d 93; Concha, 233 F.3d at, 1253-54; supra text accompanying notes
32-33, 42, 73.
85. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1760 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 1760-61 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent criticizes four conclusions
made by the majority: the assumption that the text applies only to domestic convictions;
the condemnation of the accuracy of foreign convictions as a proxy for dangerousness; the
finding of anomalies created in other sections of the statute by the inclusion of foreign
convictions in § 922(g)(1); and the suggestion that Congress did not consider foreign con-
victions when enacting the statute. See id.
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United States. 8 7 The majority recognized that the presumption
against extraterritorial application of federal statutes does not di-
rectly pertain to § 922(g)(1) but nonetheless applied it, thereby
extending the presumption well past the established maxim that
"'Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.' ' 8
The dissent found the majority's approach troublesome because it
restricted a federal statute from reaching conduct within the bor-
ders of the United States and not from reaching actions in foreign
lands; gun possession in the United States is clearly a domestic
concern.
89
According to the dissent, the majority's argument that there
are significant differences between foreign and domestic convic-
tions is baseless because "it cherry-picks a few egregious exam-
ples of convictions unlikely to correlate with dangerousness, in-
consistent with American intuitions of fairness, or punishable
more severely in this country."9 The majority ignored, however,
the "countless other foreign convictions" that do serve as accurate
proxies for dangerousness and culpability within the United
States, as well as the facts of this case, in which Small, very
shortly after completing his sentence for international gunrun-
ning, purchased another firearm.9 Citing the "worst-of-the-worst"
87. See id. at 1761 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1761-62 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S.
197, 204 n.5 (1993)).
89. See id. at 1761-62 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see supra text accompanying
notes 64-69. The dissent argued that the applications of the presumption against extra-
territorial application cited by the majority do not lend support to the majority's adoption
of the rule in the present case. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1761 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dis-
tinguishing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (holding that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 does not regulate the employment practices of American firms employ-
ing American citizens in foreign countries); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949)
(holding that a federal labor statute does not apply to a contract between the United
States and another for work done in a foreign country); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 610 (1818) (holding that a statute does not apply to robbery committed on the
high seas by a noncitizen aboard a ship owned by persons of a foreign country).
90. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1763 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
91. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). To counter the foreign statutes which punish ac-
tions that would not necessarily be illegal in the United States, the dissent cited several
foreign statutes that would serve as a proxy for dangerousness and culpability in the
United States. See id.; see also Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 244(b) (1985)
(Can.) (criminalizing the discharge of a firearm at a person with intent to endanger life);
CODIGO PENAL FEDERAL [L.P.F.] [FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE], as amended, Diario Oficial de
la Federaci6n [D.O.], (A de Agosto de 1931 (Mex.)) (prohibiting terrorism by explosives,
toxic substances, firearms, fire, flooding, or other violent means). But see supra note 68
and accompanying text. The dissent further criticizes the majority's view that the scarcity
of convictions using predicate foreign convictions weakens the usefulness of foreign convic-
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undermined the usefulness of identifying truly dangerous persons
based on foreign convictions.92
In response to the majority's invocation of the canon against
absurdities resulting from the anomalies created by the inclusion
of foreign convictions,93 the dissent argued that the anomalies
cited by the majority fall short of an "absurd" result.94 Further,
what the majority classified as an anomaly actually seemed ra-
tional to the dissent.9 For example, "Congress might have de-
cided to proceed incrementally and exempt only antitrust offenses
with which it was familiar, namely, domestic ones."96 Moreover,
the dissent was concerned that the majority's reading created an
even more dangerous anomaly by permitting persons convicted of
violent crimes abroad to possess firearms freely in the United
States.97
Finally, the dissent argued that the majority misapplied the
legislative intent of the statute.9 First, the dissent suggested that
the majority sought to guess what Congress had actually in-
tended by the phrase "any court." The Court's task, however, "'is
not the hopeless one of ascertaining what the legislators who
passed the law would have decided had they reconvened to con-
tions as a proxy for dangerousness. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1762-63 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The dissent argues that the rarity of such prosecutions supports the idea that including
foreign convictions in the scope of § 922(g)(1) will not result in a "parade of horribles." See
id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
92. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1763 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33, 42, 73, 84.
94. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1764 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Pub. Citizen v. DOJ,
491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that the
canon against absurdities should be employed only "where the result of applying the plain
language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that Con-
gress could have intended the result . .. and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to
be obvious to most anyone"); Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment) (stating that the "avoidance of unhappy consequences" is not
an adequate basis for textual interpretations).
95. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the majority's use of the canon
against absurdities with strong language: "[A]s with the extraterritoriality canon, the
Court applies a mutant version of a recognized canon when the recognized canon is itself
inapposite .... [Canons] are useless when modified in ways that Congress could never
have imagined in enacting § 922(g)(1)." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent gives an example of the incongruity
that would result from the majority's opinion: A person who is convicted domestically of
tampering with a vehicle identification number is barred from possessing firearms, while
a person who is convicted overseas of murder, rape, assault, kidnapping, or terrorism is
allowed to possess firearms in the United States. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 1764-65.
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sider [this] particular cas[el, ' but is adhering to the ordinary
meaning of the statute that they actually enacted."' Second, the
majority committed an even more dangerous error by relying
upon legislative silence as a means to derive its conclusion. 10'
Third, the dissent argued that the legislative history was not si-
lent, but included the significant fact that in the final draft of the
statute, the language limiting the application of the section to
federal and state crimes was replaced with the current lan-
guage. °2 This modification in the text of § 922(g)(1) indicated
Congress's intent to expand the scope of the statute past what
was originally contained in the Senate Report. 103
C. The Merits of the Dissenting Opinion
The rationale of the dissenting opinion has a sound basis both
in precedent and in policy. The Supreme Court has previously
suggested that "[t]he task of resolving the dispute over the mean-
ing of [a statute] begins where all such inquiries must begin: with
the language of the statute itself."0 4 The dissent applied this
precedent by citing prior decisions that have found the term
"any," when used in statutory language, to have an expansive
meaning. 05 The text of § 922(g)(1) is not limited in any way. 
6
99. Id. at 1765 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S.
368, 374 (1994)) (emphasis added).
100. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
101. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has also criticized the use of the
"Canon of Canine Silence." See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 125 S. Ct. 460,
474-75 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See Small, 124 S. Ct. at 1765 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
103. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (construing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 90-1956, at 4, 8,
28-29 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4428); supra note 10; see also Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2466, 2479 (2004) (stating that when
Congress amends a statute, the court should presume that it intends its amendment to
have a real and substantial effect). But see United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir.
2003).
104. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); see also Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980).
105. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1759 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)); see also Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400-01
(1998) (stating "any" false statement is a false statement "of whatever kind") (quoting
Gonzales, 420 U.S. at 5); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 358 (1994) ("If a
person is arrested and held on a federal charge by 'any' law enforcement officer-federal,
state, or local-that person is under 'arrest or other detention' for purposes of [the stat-
ute]. .. ."). The phrase "any court" is not limited to the boundaries of traditional Article III
courts and has been extended to include military courts. See United States v. Martinez,
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Reading the statute in context, the dissent's interpretation of §
922(g)(1) in light of the more constricting language in § 921(a)(20)
is supported by the established maxim that "where Congress in-
cludes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
in another," it can be presumed that Congress had intended the
disparity. °7 Thus, a plain reading of the term "any court" unmis-
takably results in a broad construction that includes convictions
in domestic and foreign courts. 0 8 The dissent's argument would
be convincing if it ended here."0 9 "'The plain meaning of legisla-
tion should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which] the
literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably
at odds with the intentions of its drafters."""0 There is no evi-
dence that reading § 922(g)(1) to include foreign convictions
would produce such a result; nonetheless, the majority ignored
these established maxims and instead invented an unprecedented
canon of statutory interpretation to circumvent the plain mean-
ing of the statute.
Instead of beginning its analysis with the plain meaning of the
statute, the majority began its analysis with the assumption "that
the phrase 'convicted in any court' applies domestically, not ex-
traterritorially."' Although this assumption was presumably
122 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. MacDonald, 992 F.2d 967, 970 (9th Cir.
1993); United States v. Lee, 428 F.2d 917, 920 (6th Cir. 1970).
106. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1759 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Gonzales, 520 U.S.
at 5); Lewis, 445 U.S. at 60 ("No modifier is present, and nothing suggests any restriction.
107. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)); see also Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5; Custis
v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 492 (1994); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 217
(1976).
108. But see Aron J. Estaver, Note, Dangerous Criminals or Dangerous Courts: Foreign
Felonies as Predicate Offenses Under Section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 38
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 215, 249 (2005) ("Because of the significant possibility that courts
might infringe on the constitutional rights of both potential and existing gun owners, the
U.S. Supreme Court should determine that there is ambiguity in whether section 922(g)(1)
of the Gun Control Act should extent to foreign felonies when it hears Small.").
109. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 241 ("[Where ... the statute's language is plain, 'the
sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.'" (quoting Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917))); see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 n.7 (2001) ("Because federal courts interpret, rather than
author, the federal [law], we are not at liberty to rewrite it."). There is no need to "resort to
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510
U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994).
110. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458
U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
111. Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1756.
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based on the principle against extraterritorial application of the
law, the dissent correctly points out that the majority makes a
baseless extension of this canon.112 By making this assumption,
the majority looked to statutory language, context, history, and
purpose not for the established purpose of supplementing am-
biguous language, but for contradicting an assumption notwith-
standing the plain meaning of the statutory language. 1 3 This ap-
proach is fatal from the outset. The dissent, however, followed the
established maxims of statutory interpretation by fully examin-
ing what the statute says. 14
The dissent was also convincing in criticizing the majority's
finding of a significant distinction between domestic and foreign
crimes, discussion of contextual anomalies created by the inclu-
sion of foreign convictions, and use of legislative history.1 5 The
dissent stressed that persons convicted in foreign courts are
equally culpable and dangerous as those convicted domesti-
cally. 1 6 This approach is supported by the principle theory of ret-
ribution, which rationalizes punishment and the "severity of pun-
ishment on the gravity of the act committed." 7 A criminal should
not be able to erase a criminal past by entering the United
States."8 Further, subsequent crimes committed in the United
States should be punished more severely because the person has
had the chance to start anew, but has not reformed despite being
punished for the prior offense." 9
According to the dissent, the contextual anomaly-that fewer
domestic crimes than foreign crimes would be covered by the
statute--could actually have been the intention of Congress. 2 °
This interpretation is supported by the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
112. See id. at 1761 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 1765-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 1759-60 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See generally Antonin Scalia, Com-
mon-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Inter-
preting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
115. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1763-65 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 1762-63 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117. Alex Glashausser, Note, The Treatment of Foreign Country Convictions as Predi-
cates for Sentence Enhancement Under Recidivist Statutes, 44 DUKE L.J. 134, 156 (1994).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1764 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Gayle, 342 F.3d at 93 (ad-
mitting that, depending on the crime, Congress might intend to include foreign convic-
tions); Concha, 233 F.3d at 1253-54; supra text accompanying notes 32-33, 42, 73, 84, 93.
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bacco Firearms, and Explosives' promulgation that a "[clrime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year," in-
cludes "[a]ny Federal, State or foreign offense."' 21 Perhaps more
importantly, the definition then mentions that several federal
and state court offenses are exempt under § 921(a)(20). 122 In doing
so, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives con-
firmed that foreign convictions are included as predicate crimes,
and recognized that domestic economic crimes and misdemeanors
are excluded.
123
Finally, the majority made another error in statutory interpre-
tation by following a novel canon of interpretation, 2 4 disparag-
ingly referred to as the "Canon of Canine Silence." 25 While the
use of legislative history has been criticized even when there is a
written record of the statements by members of Congress,'26 the
use of congressional silence is even more disturbing. 127 Altering
the plain meaning of the written language and justifying it with
Congress's silence is indeed a slippery slope. 28
V. IMPACT OF THE MAJORITY'S DECISION
A. Weakening Gun Control and National Security
The original Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 was enacted to "aid in curbing the problem of gun abuse
121. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco Products, Firearms, and Explosives, DOJ, 27 C.F.R. §
478.11 (2005).
122. See id. ("The term shall not include (a) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to
antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses
relating to the regulation of business practices or (b) any State offense classified by the
laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of 2 years
or less.").
123. See id.
124. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1765 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
125. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 125 S. Ct. at 474 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
Canon of Canine Silence that the Court invokes today introduces a reverse-and at least
equally dangerous-phenomenon, under which courts may refuse to believe Congress's
own words unless they can see the lips of others moving in unison.").
126. See Scalia, supra note 114, at 32 ("It is much more likely to produce a false or con-
trived legislative intent than a genuine one.").
127. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1765 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Koons Buick Pontiac
GMC, 125 S. Ct. at 474 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
128. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 125 S. Ct. at 474 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that exists in the United States."129 By allowing persons who have
been convicted for violent offenses in foreign countries to freely
possess guns in the United States,13 ° the clear policy behind the
statute is immediately weakened.13' Dangerous persons who were
convicted of violent crimes while abroad or who moved to the
United States following such a conviction are allowed to possess
firearms, despite the fact that those persons are as dangerous as
their counterparts who were convicted of similar crimes in the
United States.3 2
The implications of weakened gun control regulation are even
more critical in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks and
the current terrorist activity in Iraq. In the National Strategy for
Homeland Security of July 2002, the White House stated that its
major goals include facilitating the apprehension of potential ter-
rorists.'3 3 The national focus on identifying and removing terror-
ists from our society supports the contention that there is a sig-
nificant policy rationale behind using predicate foreign
convictions to prevent potential terrorists from possessing fire-
arms within the United States. These potential terrorists pose a
129. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 76 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2164.
130. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1763-64 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131. See Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316 (1998) (stating that "the Federal
Government has an interest in a single, national, protective policy" with regard to the pos-
session of weapons).
132. But cf S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 28 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2113 ("The principal purposes of title IV are to aid in making it possible to keep firearms
out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal back-
ground, or incompetency....").
133. See THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 26 (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005). ("We
will . . . focus on the prevention of all terrorist acts within the United States, whether in-
ternational or domestic in origin. We will use all legal means .. .to identify, halt, and,
where appropriate, prosecute terrorists in the United States. We will . . . utilize the full
range of our legal authorities."). The strategy also outlines the use of an electronic data-
base to utilize "risk modeling algorithms, link analysis, historic review of past patterns of
behavior, and other factors to distinguish persons who may pose a risk of terrorism from
those who do not." Id. at 27. In conjunction with this strategy, the President stated that
"[t]he need for homeland security is tied to our enduring vulnerability. Terrorists wish to
attack us and exploit our vulnerabilities because of the freedoms we hold dear." Letter
from the President on the National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 16, 2002), avail-
able at 2002 WL 1532381 (White House). The United States is presumably due to vulner-
able the freedoms that Americans enjoy; they are at risk because foreigners may take ad-
vantage of the same freedoms. The majority's concern with providing Americans with an
equitable judicial process is an example of such a freedom; it comes, however, at the ex-
pense of protection. That freedom allows persons who have committed egregious acts in
foreign lands the opportunity of a clean slate to commit those acts in the United States.
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threat to this country but have merely been fortunate enough to
avoid previous convictions within the United States's borders.
B. Violating the Separation of Powers
The second implication of Small does not directly or immedi-
ately threaten the physical safety of Americans, but instead poses
a long-range threat to the principles upon which our government
was founded and the Constitution was written. With the decision
in Small, the Supreme Court decreased the power of Congress,
and in so doing, increased the power of the judiciary. Tradition-
ally, it has been Congress's power to author federal laws, and the
courts' power to interpret them.134 This separation of powers has
been achieved by placing the limit on courts that they are re-
quired to look at what language has actually been promulgated,
instead of imparting their own guesswork as to what the law-
maker might have meant.'35 The fact that the court might have
drawn the line differently is not a matter for judicial, but for leg-
islative action. 136 In the wake of Small, however, future courts
may usurp the power of Congress by following the majority ra-
tionale and loosely construing or even inventing new canons of
statutory interpretation instead of following the law as it has
been codified. 3 ' Thus, Small sets a dangerous precedent that al-
lows courts to impart their own guesswork as to what Congress
intended, under the guise of following congressional intent, and
in so doing ignore what Congress has actually said, thereby re-
moving the lawmaking power from Congress and placing it
134. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 n.7
(2001) (noting that the court does not have the liberty to rewrite the law). For this reason,
the plain language of the law is the starting point for any investigation into statutory in-
terpretation. See supra text accompanying note 104.
135. See Scalia, supra note 114, at 17 ("[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic gov-
ernment, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined
by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.").
136. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 316 (1993).
137. A future court might claim that, in following the Small rationale, it is not remov-
ing power from the legislature because the legislature can and is required to speak more
clearly. See Gayle, 342 F.3d at 96 ("Congress may seek to enact gun control legislation that
criminalizes firearm possession by individuals with foreign felony convictions. If Congress
were to do so, however, it would need to speak more clearly than it has in § 922(g)(1).").
Congress, however, did speak clearly in § 922(g)(1). See Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S.
212, 217 (1976) ("Congress knew the significance and meaning of the language it em-
ployed" in § 922(g)); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 570 (1977) (finding that
the language employed in the statute was "chosen with care" and represented "a carefully
constructed package of gun control legislation").
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within the judiciary. Congress no longer has the power to prom-
ulgate the law that it intends, for at some level every statute can
be considered ambiguous,'38 and courts can now turn to their own
interpretation through a novel canon, legislative history, or even
legislative silence, to obtain the result that each desires. 9
C. Legislative Amendment
Although Congress does not have the immediate ability to re-
store the lawmaking power that was lost to the judiciary in
Small, it may take action to amend § 922(g) to serve its original
purpose to reduce gun abuse. 4 ° The Senate has already begun
this process.' On April 28, 2005, two days after the Small deci-
sion, United States Senator Mike DeWine introduced legislation
"[t]o amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the sale of a
firearm to a person who has been convicted of a felony in a foreign
court." The proposed amendment to § 922(g)(1) prohibits pos-
session of a firearm by a person:
who has been convicted-(A) in any court within the United States,
of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 year; or
(B) in any court outside the United States, of a crime punishable by
a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 year (except for any crime in-
volving the violation of an antitrust law), if the conduct giving rise to
the conviction would be punishable in any court within the United
States by a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 year had such conduct
occurred within the United States.'
43
The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary,'" but
has not yet progressed beyond the initial committee referral.'45
Upon introducing the bill, Senator DeWine stated that "we
must act to keep guns from the hands of criminals and this bill
138. See Scalia, supra note 114, at 28.
139. Justice Scalia has deemed government by unexpressed intent "tyrannical" and
considers it to be the "practical threat" of nontextual statutory interpretation. See id. at
17-18 ("[U]nder the guise of or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative
intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending
their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.").
140. S. REP. No. 90-1097 at 76-77 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2164.




145. [1 109th Congress] Cong. Index (CCH) 21,013 (Aug. 12, 2005).
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closes the loophole in our laws, assisting in that goal."146 Thus,
the introduction of Senate Bill 954 is a clear indication that some
members of Congress disagree with the Supreme Court's disre-
gard for the plain text of § 922(g)(1). As a result, Senator DeWine
and others are attempting to correct the mistake made by the Su-
preme Court and close the loophole created by Small to give the
statute the meaning that Congress had originally intended.
147
By expressly including foreign convictions within the scope of
§ 922(g)(1), Senate Bill 954 would provide the necessary "convinc-
ing indication" that the majority believed was lacking in the cur-
rent language of § 922(g)(1).141
The language proposed in Senate Bill 954 also alleviates the
majority's concerns regarding potential injustices resulting from a
broad construction of § 922(g)(1).149 The majority cautions that in-
cluding foreign convictions within the scope of the statute is dan-
gerous on three accounts: (1) foreign convictions for crimes pun-
ishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year may
include convictions for conduct that is permitted or punished less
severely in the United States;15 ° (2) persons with prior foreign
convictions would be left uncertain about their legal status;' and
(3) foreign convictions could include convictions that are "from a
legal system that is inconsistent with an American understand-
ing of fairness."5 2 Senate Bill 954 eliminates the first two of these
concerns,153 while the third can be satisfied on the trial court
level. 154
By limiting the application of foreign convictions to those that
result "if the conduct giving rise to the conviction would be pun-
ishable in any court within the United States by a term of impris-
146. Press Release, United States Senator Mike DeWine, DeWine Works to Keep Guns
Out of the Hands of Criminals (Apr. 28, 2005), http://dewine.senate.gov/ (last visited Oct.
24, 2005).
147. Senator Dianne Feinstein is a co-sponsor of Senate Bill 954. See 151 CONG. REC.
S7295 (daily ed. June 23, 2005).
148. See Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1756 (2005).
149. See id. at 1755-56.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 1756.
152. Id.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 143.
154. See Dionna K. Taylor, Comment, The Tempest in a Teapot: Foreign Convictions as
Predicate Offenses Under the Federal Felon in Possession of a Firearm Statute [United
States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003)], 43 WASHBURN L.J. 763, 789-95 (2004).
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onment exceeding 1 year had such conduct occurred within the
United States,"155 Senate Bill 954 removes the concern that ac-
tions that would not be punished or would be punished less se-
verely in the United States would prohibit future possession of
firearms in the United States. Foreign convictions such as those
cited by the majority"' would clearly be outside the scope of the
statute and would not, as the majority suggests, weaken courts'
ability to identify dangerous individuals.157
In addition, because persons with prior convictions in foreign
courts would only be subject to § 922(g)(1) if those convictions
arose from activity that would be punishable by a term of impris-
onment exceeding one year in domestic courts, those persons
would be cognizant of their legal status upon their return to the
United States."5 ' While foreign convictions are potentially more
difficult to apply to the United States legal system,15 9 a person
who has been convicted in a foreign court has the same knowl-
edge of her own conduct and of the laws of the United States as a
person who has been convicted in a domestic court. Gary Small,
for example, was convicted of shipping firearms and ammunition
into Japan and should be just as aware of his culpability as if he
had been convicted of a similar crime in the United States. 160 By
limiting the applicability of foreign convictions to those actions
that would have been punished similarly in the United States,
Senate Bill 954 removes this uncertainty of legal status.
Finally, the majority was concerned that foreign convictions
could include convictions that are inconsistent with the under-
standing of fairness in the United States legal system.16 ' A major
concern in this respect is that foreign legal systems might not of-
fer the same due process protections as the Constitution. 6 2 Al-
though Senate Bill 954 does not guarantee these constitutional
rights to persons who have been convicted in foreign courts, 163 the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law outlines a method
155. S. 954, 109th Cong. (2005).
156. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
157. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1756.
158. Cf. id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1763 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 1755-56.
162. See Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95-96.
163. See S. 954, 109th Cong. (2005).
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that courts may use to ensure that foreign convictions were ob-
tained in a manner consistent with the principles and protections
of the United States legal system. 6 4 If a foreign conviction was
obtained "under a judicial system that does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law" or if
the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant,
domestic courts are prohibited from recognizing the foreign con-
viction.'65 In addition, a domestic court is allowed to disregard a
foreign conviction after considering other potential factors, in-
cluding whether the cause of action was "repugnant to the public
policy of the United States or of the State where recognition is
sought."'66 The Third Circuit followed this approach in Small and
confirmed that the conviction in Japan did not violate these stan-
dards and should therefore be recognized by domestic courts."'
Thus, the United States legal system ensures that its citizens will
not be punished in this country for foreign convictions that are
inconsistent with the American standards of justice. Because the
inclusion of foreign convictions within the scope of § 922(g)(1)
will promote the statute's purpose of prohibiting dangerous per-
sons from possessing firearms without compromising their consti-
tutional rights, the language of § 922(g)(1) should be amended to
incorporate the changes proposed in Senate Bill 954.
VI. CONCLUSION
Gary Small was convicted of smuggling 2 rifles, 8 pistols, and
410 ammunition shells into Japan. 6 ' Within a week after com-
pleting his sentence, Small purchased a handgun in the United
States.'69 Clearly, Small is a dangerous individual; nonetheless,
he is permitted to possess a firearm in the United States because
the Supreme Court ruled that the statute prohibiting persons
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987).
165. Id. § 482(1).
166. Id. § 482(2)(d).
167. See United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2003).
168. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1759 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brief for the United States
at 3, Small, 125 S. Ct. (2005) (No. 03-750).
169. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1763 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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who have been convicted in "any court" from possessing firearms
only applies to domestic convictions.170
Although the decision in Small v. United States settled a dis-
pute among the circuits that had been ongoing for almost twenty
years,171 the majority opinion violated established maxims of
statutory construction 72 and contravened the public policy pur-
pose underlying § 922(g)(1). 7' Instead of reading the plain mean-
ing of a statute as Congress had written it, 174 the majority made a
baseless extension of the presumption against extraterritorial
application of the law"' and then proceeded to apply the novel
"Canon of Canine Silence" by relying upon legislative silence to
support its presupposition. 7 6 Moreover, allowing dangerous per-
sons to possess handguns merely because they have been con-
victed abroad frustrates the purpose of § 922(g)(1) to prevent gun
abuse in the United States.177 Thus, the decision in Small v.
United States is a dangerous one both for the treatment of dan-
gerous persons in the United States and for the future of congres-
sional power. 7 '
Lee G. Lester
170. See id. at 1758.
171. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 129-39.
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